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Abstract
Many mathematically gifted adolescents are characterized as being indolent, underachieving and unsuccessful despite their
high cognitive ability. This is often due to difficulties with social and emotional development. However, research on social
and emotional interactions in gifted adolescents has been limited. The purpose of this study was to observe differences in
complex social strategic behaviors between gifted and average adolescents of the same age using the repeated Ultimatum
Game. Twenty-two gifted adolescents and 24 average adolescents participated in the Ultimatum Game. Two adolescents
participate in the game, one as a proposer and the other as a responder. Because of its simplicity, the Ultimatum Game is an
apt tool for investigating complex human emotional and cognitive decision-making in an empirical setting. We observed
strategic but socially impaired offers from gifted proposers and lower acceptance rates from gifted responders, resulting in
lower total earnings in the Ultimatum Game. Thus, our results indicate that mathematically gifted adolescents have
deficiencies in social valuation and mentalization.
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Introduction
Mathematically gifted adolescents are known to perform better
on various cognitive tasks, including mental rotation [1,2],
problem solving [3,4], memory processing [5,6], and global-local
processing [7]. These gifted adolescents generally have high
potential to be outstanding leaders in mathematics, science, or
related fields. In fact, however, many gifted adolescents are
characterized as indolent, underachieving, and unsuccessful [8].
Gifted persons’ above-average abilities often make it difficult for
them to share their interests and to interact with others
reciprocally, causing problems in social and emotional develop-
ment. Thus, gifted adolescents are often judged to be emotionally
maladapted to social groups [9,10]. There are also controversial
results indicating that this view of maladjustment is false [11,12].
Although developing social valuation and mentalizing abilities
in gifted adolescents is crucial for themselves and for society as a
whole, few relevant studies have been done, and the results
regarding the social and mentalizing skills of gifted adolescents are
controversial. In this study, we aimed to quantify social valuation
and mentalizing abilities in gifted adolescents using the Ultimatum
Game, a simple game that can explain complex social strategic
decision-making in a laboratory setting [13]. Two players
participate in the game to divide a sum of money, one as a
proposer and the other as a responder. The proposer decides how
to divide the sum, and the responder can either accept or reject the
offer. If the responder accepts, the sum is divided according to the
offer. If the responder rejects, neither player obtains anything. The
rational and optimal behavior, suggested by game theory, is that
the proposer should offer the smallest amount possible and the
responder should accept any amount offered. However, this is
hardly the case in human subjects in empirical settings. On
average the proposer offers 40% of the sum to the responder and
16% of the offers is rejected [14]. Because of the simplicity of the
game, the Ultimatum Game is an apt tool for the investigation of
complex human emotional and cognitive decision-making pro-
cesses in an empirical setting.
A previous functional MRI study using the Ultimatum Game
observed brain activity associated with emotion (insula) and
cognition (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) [15]. The findings imply
that the relative dominance between the emotional and cognitive
regions, which are responsible for fairness monitoring and
economic profit-maximizing behavior, respectively, determines
how humans make decisions during social interactions in the
Ultimatum Game. Several studies have also found supportive
evidence for emotional and cognitive processes in the Ultimatum
Game [16,17]. Another study highlighted a different aspect of the
Ultimatum Game, namely the involvement of theory of mind in
real social interactions [18]. This study found that the anterior
paracingulate cortex and the posterior superior temporal sulcus,
two of the three classic theory-of-mind areas, were activated in
Ultimatum Game participants. The authors concluded that
inferring the intentions of others activated the theory-of-mind
neural network. Moreover, modulation of the prefrontal function
using transcranial magnetic stimulation and a study of prefrontal
lesion patients have been carried out in order to investigate the
causal relationship between behavior and prefrontal brain activity
[19,20]. These neuroimaging studies support the idea that the
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social valuation and mentalizing abilities in gifted adolescents.
Neuroimaging studies of gifted adolescents to date have
endeavored mainly to find neural correlates of their superior
intelligence. Facilitated activation in the posterior parietal cortex
during general intelligence tasks was found in gifted adolescents
compared with controls [21]. Furthermore, when performing
three-dimensional mental rotations, mathematically gifted male
adolescents activate a unique brain network, including the bilateral
parietal and frontal cortex, along with the anterior cingulate cortex
[2]. Electroencephalography studies showed that gifted adolescents
displayed higher alpha power [22,23], more regular event-related
potential waveforms [24], and less source activation [25] than
average adolescents during cognitive tasks. To our knowledge, no
neuroimaging studies of emotional and social abilities in gifted
adolescents exist.
We hypothesized that mathematically gifted adolescents would
behave deficiently in complex social decision making that requires
social valuation and mind-reading abilities, described by more
strategic offers, less acceptance rates, and thus less total earnings. A
previous survey-based study supports our hypothesis that gifted
adolescents experience difficulties in social coping strategies [26].
We analyzed the proposer and responder behaviors of gifted and
average adolescents and correlated their behavior with IQ and
creativity test scores. This investigation should provide insight into
the social valuation and mind-reading behaviors of mathematically
gifted adolescents.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Fully informed written consent was obtained from all subjects
and their parents, and the Korea Advanced Institute of
Technology Ethical Committee approved this study.
Participants
The gifted adolescents were 22 healthy middle school volunteers
(age: 14.05+0.49 years, 16 males and 6 females) with no
neurological or psychiatric diseases. They were selected through
both a selective written examination and recommendations from
their school principal and classroom teacher. All had been
educated in a private institute with a specialized curriculum for
gifted adolescents for more than two years. Twenty-four average
adolescents of mean age 13.96+0.20 years (14 males and 10
females) from the local middle school in Daejeon, Korea, also
participated. They were healthy volunteers with no history of
psychiatric or neurological diseases (Table 1).
The gifted adolescents showed a mean full-scale IQ of 142.6
(SD=5.95) as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children-Third Edition (WISC-III) [27]. The average adolescents
had a mean IQ of 110.7 (SD=13.40) as measured by WISC-III. A
Khatena-TorranceCreative PerceptionInventory(KTCPI) testwas
also administered to both groups of adolescents [28]. The mean
KTCPI score of the gifted adolescents was 66.09 (SD=23.06) and
was estimated by averaging the ‘What Kind of Person Are You’
(WKOPAY) (66.68+27.14) and ‘Something About Myself’ (SAM)
(65.50+30.93) scores. In the average adolescents, the WKOPAY
(48.44+24.79) and SAM (64.96+29.92) scores yielded a total
KTCPI score of 56.70 (SD=18.15). We found that the gifted
adolescents had significantly higher WKOPAY and IQ scores than
the average adolescents (WKOPAY: t(44)=22.408; p=0.020; IQ:
t(32.32)=210.57; p,0.001). Specifically, a subcategory of WKO-
PAY, the Disciplined Imagination (DI) score, was significantly
higher in the gifted adolescents than in the average adolescents
(t(44)=22.398; p=0.021; see Table S1). There were no significant
differences in the SAM or KTCPI scores, mean age or gender
(p.0.05).
Procedures
The gifted and average groups were transported from their
schools to our laboratory at KAIST. The students were distributed
into two groups of proposers and responders. We confirmed that
the proposers and responders did not know each other. The gifted
group and the average group were tested on separate dates. In
each session, two adolescents along with an instructor went into a
separate room and performed the Ultimatum Game.
Two adolescents played the Ultimatum Game, one as a
proposer and one as a responder, for ten trials. Each player’s
role was randomly assigned and fixed throughout the trials. We
used face-to-face interaction to maximally shape other-regarding
behaviors and a repeated game to emphasize strategic behaviors.
At the beginning of the session, the subjects were given an oral
Table 1. Participants’ demographic characteristics.
average adolescents (N=24) gifted adolescents (n=22) Significance level
Variables mean SD mean SD
Age (years) 13.96 0.20 14.05 0.49 t(27.20)=20.770
p=0.448
Sex (male/female) 14/10 16/6 x
2=1.05
p=0.364
IQ 110.7 13.40 142.6 5.95 t(32.32)=210.57
*p ,0.001
AKhatena-Torrance Creative Perception Inventory 56.70 18.15 66.09 23.06 t(44)=21.560
p=0.126
What Kind of Person Are You? 48.44 24.79 66.68 27.14 t(44)=22.408
* p=0.020
Something About Myself 64.96 29.92 65.50 30.93 t(44)=20.061
p=0.952
AThe Khatena-Torrance Creative Perception Inventory (KTCPI) score was estimated by averaging the What Kind of Person Are You (WKOPAY) and Something About
Myself (SAM) scores.
*p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018224.t001
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Demonstration rounds were played until both of the adolescents
fully understood the game. The instructor provided the proposer
with ten $1 bills to begin each trial. In each trial, the proposer
offered a certain portion of the $10 to the responder, who accepted
or rejected the offer. During the offer, the proposer was required
to explicitly count the bills one by one to prevent confusion
regarding the offer amount. Then, the responder would nod up
and down or shake his/her head left and right to indicate his/her
decision to accept or reject the offer, respectively. If the responder
accepted the offer, each player received the amount the proposer
offered. If the responder rejected the offer, both players received
nothing, and the money was withdrawn. The subjects were told
that they could keep the money they had acquired after ten trials.
The instructor recorded the offers and the responses throughout
the session.
Data Analysis
A Pearson chi-square test was used to determine whether the
distributions of demographic and Ultimatum Game behavioral
variables differed by group. The behavioral variables included the
proposers’ offer distribution, proposers’ type distribution, mean
offer, total earnings and the responders’ acceptance rate. The
offers were defined as unfair (,$5), fair (= $5), or hyperfair (.$5).
The proposer types were either strategic or non-strategic
depending on the opponent responder’s decision to accept or
reject the offer in the previous trial. Strategic proposers were those
who raised or sustained their offer amount after their previous
offer was rejected and those who lowered or sustained their offer
amount after their previous offer was accepted. Non-strategic
proposers were those who reduced their offer after a rejection or
raised their offer after an acceptance. The alpha level was set at
0.05 for the statistical tests. Correlation analyses of the
demographic and behavioral data were performed via Pearson
correlations. The statistical package SPSS for Windows (version
15.0; SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL) was used for statistical analysis.
Results
No significant difference between the average and gifted
adolescents was revealed in the distribution of offers by level
(unfair, fair, and hyperfair offers) (Figure 1). In both groups,
approximately 50% of the offers were fair, 35% of offers were
unfair, and 15% of the offers were hyperfair. Fair offers were
significantly more frequent than hyperfair offers within both
groups (Average: x
2=24.798; p,0.0001; Gifted: x
2=14.02;
p=0.0002). In the average adolescents, fair offers were signifi-
cantly more frequent than unfair offers (x
2=3.963 p=0.047), but
no corresponding difference was found for gifted adolescents
(x
2=2.173; p=0.140). Notably, very unfair offers ($2o r$1) were
rare in both groups ($1 and $2 were each offered once in each
group).
We categorized proposers as strategic or non-strategic (Figure 2).
The gifted adolescents had a significantly higher proportion of
strategic proposers than did the average adolescents (x
2=4.861;
p=0.027).
The mean offer of the gifted adolescents as proposers
($4.67+0.72) was marginally smaller than that of the average
adolescents ($5.32+0.55), but the difference was not significant
(p=0.987).
The acceptance rate of the responders in the gifted group was
lower than that in the average group. Specifically, significant
differences were found in the fair offer $5( x
2=18.961; p,0.0001)
and the unfair offer $3( x
2=5.00; p=0.025) (Figure 3).
The total earnings of the gifted adolescents ($32.95+16.30)
were significantly smaller than those of the average adolescents
($42.67+8.43) (t(30.88)=2.57; p=0.018).
We looked for relationships between Ultimatum Game
behaviors (mean offer, distribution of offers, acceptance rate,
and total earnings) and demographic variables (IQ and KTCPI).
There were no correlations between IQ and behavioral variables
in either the gifted or the average group (p.0.05). However, we
found a significant negative correlation between the number of
unfair offers and KTCPI test score in the gifted adolescents.
Negative correlations were found specifically in the KTCPI
subcategories of WKOPAY (r=20.614; p=0.034) and DI
(r=20.867; p,0.001). No significant correlations were found
for the average adolescents. In addition, there were no significant
differences in behavioral variables across gender.
Discussion
In this study, we aimed to observe differences in complex social
strategic behaviors between gifted and age-matched average
adolescents. The results support the hypothesis that mathemati-
cally gifted adolescents behave deficiently in social valuation and
theory of mind, as indicated by strategic but socially impaired
offers in proposers and lower acceptance rates in responders,
resulting in lower total earnings in the Ultimatum Game. These
findings are consistent with previous studies of mathematically
gifted adolescents that have described difficulties in social and
emotional coping strategies [26]. Specifically, a study using
questionnaires found that highly gifted adolescents perceive
themselves as less popular, having a greater internal locus of
control, and having more social and emotional problems than
average adolescents [29]. In ratings of peer perceptions of
athleticism, popularity and social standing, modestly gifted
adolescents exceeded the highly gifted, indicating that giftedness
may entail risks of developing problems in peer relations [30].
No significant difference between the average and gifted
adolescents was found in the distribution of offers by level (unfair,
fair, and hyperfair). Approximately half of all offers were fair in
both the average and the gifted groups. These results are
consistent with a previous finding that younger children made
larger offers than older participants in the Ultimatum Game,
suggesting that adults have made a qualitative shift to match the
Figure 1. Distribution of offers made by gifted and average
adolescents by level: unfair (,$5), fair (=$5), and hyperfair
(.$5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018224.g001
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average and gifted adolescents are very sensitive to fairness. The
finding that unfair $1 and $2 offers were very rare also supports
this hypothesis.
Theoffersofthegiftedadolescentsweremore strategicthanthose
of the average adolescents. However, the total earnings of the gifted
adolescents were lower than those of the average adolescents,
indicating that strategic offer behavior does not necessarily lead to
more money being earned in the game. The important aspect of the
Ultimatum Game is not the mathematical strategy but rather the
necessary social adaptive mentalizing strategies, including fairness,
cooperation, and reputation [32]. Thus, we speculate that while
gifted adolescents are mathematically more strategic, they are
impaired in reading their opponent’s mind.
The acceptance rate of the responders in the gifted group was
lower than that of the average group for both fair and unfair offers.
Rejection of unfair offers supports the hypothesis that gifted
adolescents are more sensitive to unfairness and that they try to
punish an opponent’s unfair behavior. Rejection of a fair offer
could be thought of as a highly irrational behavior. However, in
the repeated Ultimatum Game with fixed players, 13% of
hyperfair offers were rejected in normal adults [33]. Rejection of
a fair offer in the gifted group might result from their hyper-
motivation to seek a higher reward in the next trial. Consequently,
their strategic behaviors made the total earnings of the gifted
adolescents lower than those of the average adolescents.
We found a significant negative correlation between the ratio of
unfair offers and creativity test scores in the gifted adolescents,
indicating that the adolescents with better self-regulation and
other-regarding behaviors offered fewer unfair and more fair
proposals [28]. Negative correlations were found specifically with
the KTCPI creativity test subcategories of ‘What Kind of Person
are You’ and ‘Disciplined Imagination.’ These measures were
designed to capture participants’ perceptions of their creativity
[28]. In other words, the gifted adolescents with more self-
awareness of their creativity and heightened disciplined imagina-
tion were less likely to present unfair offers. These results cannot be
explained by comparison with the case of the average adolescents.
Previous studies have found that gifted adolescents are character-
ized not only by developmentally advanced electrophysiological
activity of the brain, as represented by higher alpha frequency
activity [22,23], but also by distinct brain network activation,
including the bilateral parietal and frontal cortices, and anterior
cingulate cortex [2,7]. Our finding of negative correlations only in
the gifted and not in the average adolescents is partly explained by
previous neuroimaging findings. While the creativity test scores
correlated with Ultimatum Game behaviors, IQ was not
correlated with any behavioral variable. The correlation results
are consistent with our behavioral findings that mathematical
strategies are not necessarily required for success in the game, but
social adaptive mentalizing abilities are crucial.
We used face-to-face and repeated interaction with fixed players
that most resemble real world ultimatum bargaining situations.
The limitation is that the proposer and responder behaviors are
dependent on each other. This issue could potentially be solved
when the offers and responses are analyzed separately for each of
the 10 trials. Thus, we computed offer fluctuations between the
first and the second offer (Figure S1), ratio of offers for each trial
(Figure S2) and acceptance rates for each trial (Figure S3). We
found significant correlation between the first and the second offer
after rejecting the first offer in the gifted group (p,0.0001). We
couldn’t find the significant difference between the first trial and
the subsequent 9 trials in ratio of offers and acceptance rates. The
results indicate that the overall offer ratio is similar between the
gifted and average groups during the trials, but the distribution of
offers are socially inept especially after the responder rejects the
prior offer, resulted in lower acceptance rates in the gifted group.
This study has provided insight into the relationship between
mathematical giftedness and strategic decision making in interac-
tive social settings. One limitation that should be considered is the
relatively small number of subjects. Thus, unfair offers of $1 and
$2 were very rare, and we could not perform further analysis on
these offers. Furthermore, this study provides only behavioral
results; thus, further research is necessary to explore the causal
association between intentions and behaviors using neuroimaging
techniques. We hope that this study provides insight into how
gifted adolescents should be educated and how they can succeed in
complex social transactions using learned social collaborative and
Figure 3. Offer acceptance rates of gifted and average
adolescents (* p,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018224.g003
Figure 2. Proposer type distribution of gifted and average
adolescents. A proposer offers either strategically or non-strategically
depending on the opponent responder’s decision to accept or reject in
the previous trial. Strategic proposers were those who raised or
maintained their offer amount after their previous offer was rejected or
those who lowered or maintained their offer amount after their
previous offer was accepted. Non-strategic proposers were those who
reduced their offer after a rejection or raised their offer after an
acceptance (*p,0.05, ** p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018224.g002
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Supporting Information
Figure S1 Offer fluctuations between the first and the second
offer. Offer fluctuation after acceptance in gifted group (Pearson
correlation, p=0.238, slope=0.16475), rejection in gifted group
(Pearson correlation, p,0.0001, slope=0.56974), acceptance in
average group (Pearson correlation, p=0.033, slope=0.23978),
and rejection in average group (Pearson correlation, p=0.037,
slope=0.3199).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Ratio of offers for each trial (* p,0.05).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Acceptance rates for each trial (* p,0.05).
(TIF)
Table S1 Khatena-Torrance Creative Perception Inventory
statistics.
(DOCX)
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